Ambler's book traces the story of Charles Latimer's, a British professor who writes detective novels in his spare time, descent into the world of international espionage and greed. Ambler is wonderful at recreating the recollections of an earnest and somewhat simple man who is hopelessly out his league as his follows the life history of a corpse he's been shown for laughs in a Turkish morgue.

This is the real deal in terms of mystery/spy novels. It's a delightfully intelligent and engaging page turner by the author who invented the modern spy genre. The roiling, ethnically and politically complex Europe of the 1930 is nearly another character of the novel, but unlike the work of more contemporary authors, the reader never feels bludgeoned over the head with historical trivia.

This is a fun, interesting, page-turning thriller. Great beach reading, but intelligent enough not to insult the serious reader of literature.

This is a quite wondeful little book. It is hard to believe that a book that was written so many years ago could still be thrilling and exciting today. I now understand why Ambler is thought to be the father of the spy novel. It would be difficult to find a writer today that could build up this kind of suspense and intrigue. I couldn't help thinking as I was reading it that it would make a great black and white movie, and then I found out that it actually was made into a movie in the 40's. Peter Lorre and Greenstreet starred in it. It would be nice to see this old movie now that I've read the book. The book is set mostly in the Balkans, but Ambler takes the reader to Athens and Paris too. The story is about a mystery writer's curiosity to trace the life of a criminal that he first sees dead on a slab in Turkey. Charles Latimer gets pulled into all kinds situations while he pursues the truth. The story is action-filled right to the end. This has to be one of the best books from the 30's (at least in this genre).

Ordinarily, I don't read thrillers, but since this was one of my mother's favorite books, I thought I would give it a try. What a surprise!

Instead of some overblown macho stud like James Bond, the protagonist is Charles Latimer, a quiet English academic, who becomes intrigued by the death of an arch-felon, Dimitrios Makropoulos. He decides to find out more about this Dimitrios, and winds up traversing Europe from Istanbul to Paris.

There are no gimmicks in Ambler's writing; he presents a mystery and unravels it. Supposedly, Ambler is responsible for the "modern" spy thriller. If so, he did it well, but the genre devolved after him. A Coffin for Dimitrios is a superb book whether it is classified a mystery, thriller, or whatever.

For someone not to well versed in the history of the recent Balkan war this is a great read. I like the author's insightful historical aspect to the book and his unbiased reporting. It is a book that gives much incentive to think about the people living in that region and the author makes a very honest attempt to be nonjudgmental. If you do not know much about the Balkans and have asked yourself why such violent confrontations have happened there over and over this is certainly a good start. The only negative about this book is the bad editing and the the convoluted sentences that sometimes have to be read over again several times to make sense.

Veteran journalist Simon Winchester retraces his steps through the Balkans 20 years after a brief vacation there, to rediscover a region where the geography is as dizzying as the political and ethnic agendas. His journey from Vienna to Istanbul encompasses the crisis in Kosovo and in a series of astute vignettes, Winchester meets some of the major players and the victims. All around him is a simmering cauldron of hatred which has spilled blood yet again and the issues provoke more questions than can ever be answered. Winchester has questions of his own, but he is unable to answer them in any depth. But then, most Westerners have also had trouble analysing the Balkan history of bloodshed. He is only skimming the surface here and for guidance refers to the great works of Nobel prize winner Ivo Andric, whose book Bridge On The Drina remains a classic text to understanding the background of Balkan turmoil. Unfortunately, Winchester departs Kosovo in June 1999, just after NATO enters the region to restore some semblance of calm. I wish he had remained to write about what happened next. The book fizzles a bit when he goes to Bulgaria. There is now a bewildering plethora of books on recent Balkan upheavals. Winchester's wry observations would serve well as a beginner's guide to one of the most troubled and fascinating places on earth.

The Fracture Zone is one of the most unusual books I have ever read. It provides a mosaic of perspectives on the former Yugoslavia centering on the UN-led end of the most recent conflicts in the region. Although the effect can be a little unsettling, the advantage of the approach is to make the experience more personal and more human than a narrower, more disciplined method would have done.

The book's premise is to share the author's experiences through the context of his former visit during peaceful times to the same region, historical perspective on why and how the tensions and conflicts have evolved, and on-the-ground insights from conversations with those who hate and those who do not.

The effect is not unlike what one's own experiences might have been like if a time machine brought us first into the year 1858 in South Carolina and then in the same area in the year 1865. Without more perspective, someone from Kosovo would not be able to understand what had happened between the two times. That is what the author has been trying to accomplish in this book.

Through flashbacks and narration, you will travel twice (once before the wars, and once after them) through the former Yugoslavia on a journey starting in Vienna and ending in Istanbul. You will have many unforgettable moments, like seeing thousands of displaced refugees squatting in a former alpine meadow while overwhelmed army forces try to save lives. You'll learn what a Sarajevo rose is (no, it's not what you think). And you will find how historical lessons can be used as excuses to fan current hatreds of those who are similar and different from oneself.

All of this has an incredible immediacy because this is like the worst of the Nazi era, being relived in many ways in our own times.

The author keeps asking, why? He poses some answers, but ultimately, it is unanswerable. Perhaps in time, we can make sense of this terrible tragedy.

Here are some cautions: Anyone who wants a serious history will not like this book. Anyone who wants a brilliant essay will be even less satisfied.

If you are open to a new approach to understanding an extremely complex circumstance, you will find this book to be interesting. It will expand your curiosity, and that will be good. We all need to ponder the lessons here, to help avoid their recurrence. Share this book with one other person, so the memory will expand.

This book is an exhaustive account of the events that led to the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, one of the complex, multiethnic republics that had once comprised Yugoslavia. Laura Silber and Allan Little, drawing largely on interviews with the leading characters on all sides in the conflict, have written a book that will be consulted for generations to come, for diplomacy's sake.

It is perhaps one of the longer books written about the Bosnian war (it does treat the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, respectively, as well as prime readers on the recent history of Yugoslavia in the late 1980s that shaped it for war). While it lacks in the intricate history to be found in Noel Malcolm's history of Bosnia, and the compressed highlights and historical transitions that are illustrated most vividly in Tim Judah's journalistic work about the Serbs, Silber and Little's work is most effective, in this reviewer's view, in meticulously chronicling every detail of the war in Bosnia. The front lines, the politicians, the paramilitary groups, the efforts and experiences of the few peacekeepers, the atrocities and experiences of civilians caught between exchanges of gunfire; Silber and Little have not overlooked anything surrounding Bosnia's demise. However, as the bulk of this book is devoted to Bosnia, the brief background and key events leading to Yugoslavia's demise provided in these pages could be inadequate for some first-time readers of this tragedy.

The revised Penguin Books edition of this book (under review) appeared in 1996. Throughout the dense text are recurrent references to Kosovo, the province from which Slobodan Milosevic, now an indicted war criminal made it to power in Serbia, and later in the rump Yugoslavia. Silber and Little, at that early stage, predicted that worse was yet to come in Kosovo (see pp. 383-384), writing that the post-Dayton police-dominated province with its Albanian majority (and Serb minority) would be influenced by what happened to the rest of the former Yugoslavia. In Silber and Little's words: "A peace settlement based on the principle that statehood derives from ethnicity sent powerful signals to Serbia's minorities...that could lead to further conflict in the future" (p. 384). Once again, the age-old phenomenon of having writing on the wall; Kosovo was a disaster waiting to happen, with advance warning.

Essential reading for anyone wishing to understand the faceted character and nature of a long, gruesome war.

I became involved in the Bosnian crisis in a professional capacity as an intelligence analyst and briefing officer at the headquarters, U.S. European command, and served in Sarajevo with the initial NATO Peace Implementation Force (IFOR). I have been studying and following the history of this area and events in Bosnia ever since. I am familiar with many of the events in the crisis and personalities involved, and found this to be an outstanding summary of the process of the disintegration of Yugoslavia. The portion of the book covering the rise of Milosevic and the departure from Yugoslavia of Slovenia is particularly well done. The coverage of the Bosnian war is a bit cursory, and takes the perspective of the conventional wisdom of the international journalistic community. I know from talking to UNPROFOR officers and others who were there that the Muslims were not totally innocent victims and the Serbs universally evil monsters. With that small caveat, I would strongly recommend this book to anyone trying to understand the entire Yugoslav crisis. It is meticulously researched and documented. Anyone trying to understand what is happening in Kosovo right now would be well advised to read this book.

Being closely affected by the entire catastrophy of the last 12 years in Yugoslavia I have read almost everything avaliable on Amazon and in the bookstores pertaining to the subject. This is the Mother Goose of all the books on the last 12 years in the region. One realizes this because all other books quote this one quite often. They are usually recycled or paraphrazed parts of Laura Silber's book. The book is cold and unemotional the way a book about such an event should be. It didnt leave anything out and the sequence of events is perfect. Everything that came after this books publishing was either forshadowed or is just an effect of things in this book. On the other hand if one wants to read books by clowns who were responsible for everything allow me to recommend Slobodan Milosevics' "Years of decisions", Holbrookes "To end a War" (sic. but only when my Q rating is really high), Zimmermanns "Origins of a catastophe"(sic. was blind but now can see). Read this book, understand what and how went on and hold your own against any expert on the subject.

I think this book details why politicians and large political / military organizations like NATO have such a difficulty in successfully performing low level military conflicts like the peacekeeping effort in the Yugoslavia region. This book details by representing the destruction and ongoing fighting, just how ineffective the peacekeeping process was at the start due to a half-hearted commitment by the political leaders. The military in the conventional sense, is not a police force or social working group, the purpose of the military is to destroy the enemy. When asking this force to go about a job they are not designed for with one hand tied behind their back and the constant fear of every decision being second-guessed, is there any surprise that the effort did not work for some time.

I think this book provides one with a good start to understanding the civil war in Kosovo. I think one would need more details to have a better understanding of what will need to take place for this area to live in peace. A good follow up would be to read Waging Modern War by Wesley Clark.

Well,first of all I must admit that I'm halfway the book now but I'm already able to recommend this book. I had a library copy at home when I bought this book and to be honest I was sorry I did that because I could read the book for free BUT in the very first pages thanks to the writing of Mr.Campbell I have congratulated this book for getting a place in the bookshelf of mine called "Only the best books I've ever read in my life". This book is so good as it tells things as they were.Mr.Campbell tells the truth and doesnt sympathise anybody except the justice. His writing is amazing and you wouldn't be surprise when you get transfered so easily into a strange world full of mysteries. I try to buy every single book about my country and I have plenty of those but "The Road to Kosovo" is the best one. I'll finish by saying -Even if you read 100 books in this subject you wont be able to find as much true information as in this one. And YOU'LL GET TO KNOW THE BOSNIA,KOSOVA AS YOU KNOW YOUR OWN COUNTRY - AND THAT'S ALL THANKS TO GREG CAMPBELL

The Road to Kosovo A Balkan Diary was a good fast read. I found his experiences similar to a "road trip" I had taken through the R.S. and Croatia with Bosniak License Plates while on vacation during my year working for the U.N. The book gives you a good feel for a foreigner's impression of the area.

So I bought this book because I wanted to learn about the Armenian Holocaust, something that was only touched on in grade school. Instead I recieved a book that is full of wonderful academic work but confusing to read, and not focused on the genocide itself. I wanted a book closer to Martin GIlberts history of the holocaust which blends historical accuracy with documents and interesting accounts of the tradgedy. Instead this book goes overboard documenting German complicity while shying away from the actual deportations,t he massacres, maybe this is due to a lack of actual historical record. Fine...I will settle for that. But until Im satisfied im going to read "caravans to oblivion" and other books on the subject because I want a book dealing with the genocide, not just the documents of government soruces and diaries by government figures. I believe the author uses the volumes of sources to prove Turkish complicity. Except I didnt need to be convinced of complicity by the Turks( we all know the Turks butchered the armenians, otherwise how can one exlained why no armenians live in turkey today?) I wanted the history of what happaned in Armenia, I wanted to learn about the Armenian rebellion at Van and Musa Dagh.

Oh well...

Hello
I am Greek but my origin is Armenian. I have read this book in Greek translation. I didn't really enjoy it. It is a good history book for history students and schollars. It is a product of hard work and you will learn more about the genocide if you read it. I have read in Greeks "the crime of silence". I found it better.
Read more about Armenian genocide, dont believe the Lies of Turks. In our days Turks are not responsible for the crimes of their grand fathers. The lands of my grand father was Armenian, Kurdish and Turkish too. This land is Turkish now and I dont want to take it back. I want justice for the death people. I will be happy if the official Turkish State acknowledges the genocide. The memory must be alive for ever.

Incredible research went into this book. Not only can one get a historic view of the Armenian Genocide, but it also demonstrates the essentials of good academic research.

I first would like to challenge the last reviewer to explain when Turkish Cypriots ever accounted for a 33% minority on Cyprus during those turbulent years. Statistics consistantly show the number to be around 18%. With that said, this is not a book which engages in finger pointing. Atrocities were undoubtledy commited by both parties. In fact, the authors on several occasions give us numbers of the Turkish Cypriots killed, wounded, or fleeing. I wonder just how much one reviewer took a hard look at this book when mentioning pictures seen in occupied Cyprus of Turkish Cypriot children dead in a bathtub, yet the picture is IN THE BOOK!!! Personal acounts and personal tragadies of the invasion and events leading up to it are not the main focus of this study. Rather it is the 'how' and 'why' of the unfolding events.

O'Malley and Craig do a good job of this I believe. I would have liked to see a more detailed analysis of how exactly the US pushed the junta in attempting a coup to remove Makarios. Did Kissinger know Turkey would invade and the cards would play themselves out, or did Kissinger have to work more with Turkey "under the table" to broker what seems to be a playing out of the 1964 alternate plan to partition Cyprus? Two other brief criticisms are 1) the sometimes general and arbitrary footnotes to "Interview with the authors." O'Malley and Craig interviewed several people so it can be confusing just what "interview" they are refering to, and 2) the sometimes frustrating footnotes to the House sub-committee papers and other government documents, which to no fault of the authors, isn't exaclty readily available at the local library for personal reference.

That said I think the book is an excellent study into the rather unfortunate methods the United States implements its foreign policy in order to protect military interests at all costs. Lets hope that in the future the Cypriots (both Greek and Turkish) can decide their own fate rather than Ankara, Athens, London, and especially Washington at their necks. A unified, peaceful Cyprus is attainable, especially in the EU. Let's not lower our hopes and aspirations in saying that partition is the only solution.

Stemming from its strategic position; Cyprus became an obsession for the quasi-party's self serving interests at the behest of the Cypriots. Cyprus a divided stated emerged from relentless back room politics between the U.S, Britain, Turkey and Greece. Hidden away within its unassuming territory lies an overworked highly active agency mandated to keep track on advances in enemy nuclear missile technology; early warning of attacks and controlling the passage of water ways for the free flowing of oil for the free world. All this attained at a minor price of gross negligence of human rights.

Cyprus has suffered for its strategically important position in the eastern Mediterranean. Colonized by the Greeks in the second millennium BC, it was tossed from Persian, Roman, Byzantine, and finally to Ottoman empire. The Turks retained possession of the island until it was annexed by Great Britain in 1914. From the 1930s onward Greek Cypriots agitated vociferously--and after 1955 militarily--for independence from Britain and union with Greece. Reeling under the pressure for independence the British sought a way to accommodate and still retain control by dividing the two communities and giving them a constitution. In 1960, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots agreed on a constitution for an independent Cyprus, with the Greek Archbishop Makarios III as its first president and Kutchuk as its Vice President. This agreement came into being with the Treaty of Establishment, Treaty of Alliance and the 1960 constitution and Britain as the guarantor of unified Cyprus. This setup was fatally flawed, as it established a system of government envisioned by outside powers neglecting to address the deep rooted divisions within the Greeks and the Turk Cypriots. In late 1963, after Makarios made 13 constitutional changes that would abolish the Turkish power of veto over legislation on defense, security, foreign affairs, elections, municipalities and taxation lead the Turks withdrew from the government. A decade of internecine warfare and assassinations followed between the two communities that were mediated or, more precisely, "observed" by the United Nations.
Ultimately--and some would argue, inevitably--the two most interested powers were drawn toward direct intervention: first Greece, which attempted to unite the island under its own form of benign military dictatorship on July 15, 1974; and then Turkey, which responded far more effectively and invaded the place five days later. Cyprus constitutes one of the great unresolved conflicts of the late 20th century.

The Greek Cypriots feeling betrayed by the Western began to look towards the Soviets for help. With this realization and a long-standing plan to save its strategic assets on the island from what U.S. officials feared might be a left-wing takeover if the crisis in Cyprus were not resolved. Cyprus, became invaluable to Washington for monitoring both Soviet nuclear missile activity in Central Asia and potential military threats in the Middle East. Ongoing instability threatened these assets. By mounting an invasion, Turkey saved them. The Americans had judged that to let Greece and Turkey fight it out would be disastrous for the Western interests, would destroy the NATO's southern wing and leave the entire eastern Mediterranean vulnerable to Soviet take-over. According to McNally the Turks had threatened that if there was any military intervention against their invasion, they would leave NATO. Since the Americans badly needed an insurance policy against the Soviets; Kissinger put "no credible pressure" on Turkey "not to go ahead with an invasion." He then did "everything" he could "to help the Turks make up their mind that intervention was the only way they could get satisfaction." And having quietly encouraged the Turks to invade, while systematically "ignoring the advice of his own experts," he played what even the Turks called a "constructive and helpful role" by not protesting the invasion and the subsequent division of the island.

The Greeks have suspected that there was a conspiracy and insist that Turkey could not have acted alone. The Greek sentiment was described by Makarios after the Turkish attack: "The United States is the only country which could have exerted pressure on Turkey and prevented the invasion.". The charge itself is perhaps based on circumstantial events by observing that the United States tilted toward the more powerful and stabler Turkey over Greece for their interests; and that Kissinger not only knew about Turkish plans to invade Cyprus but may have tacitly approved it. Kissinger's main concern was to control the invasion and force Turkey to assume defensive postures in order not to flare up a direct confrontation Greece and Turkey two key NATO allies. United Kingdom being the guarantor of Cyprus unity considered placing their between Cyprus and Turkey to deter the Turks; but was vetoed by U.S. However U.K decided against such an action to prevent a confrontation with a NATO ally (Turkey) and create a rift with U.S.

In a report submitted by the MP's of British parliament it was stated that Britain had a legal right, a moral obligation and military capacity to intervene, but choose not to do so. Britain had considerable forces at hand, and could have intervened with or without Turkey, to reverse the coup and had little doubt that either alone or as part of the U.N force, Britain could have forestalled the first Turkish invasion. The chairman declared that Cyprus crises had been a true test of Britain's standing in the world, which should be measured not by its military might or economic wealth, but by its standard of justice, integrity and humanity, and by the way it protects the weak, On all these counts Britain had failed Cyprus for reasons which the Government refused to give.

When I started reading this book I just couldn't put it down. Excellent reading, informative and well researched. The only critism I have is that I would have liked to have seen more about the role of Rauf Denktash and his TMT (Turkish Resistance Movement)organization and the fact that his design for the partition of Cyprus was the driving force in the conflict between the two communities. The TMT is only mentioned breifly in the book. Rauf Denktash and his TMT were the said "agitators" or instigators of the clashes between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. His murdering of both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in order to get the two parties fighting, and his inflamatory retoric were the main cause of the intercommunal violence of the late 1950's and 1963 - 1968. The book's reference to Turkish Cypriots being forcibly persuaded by thier leaders to move to Turkish enclaves is correct. The leaders the book is referring to is Rauf Denktash and his TMT cronies. He was recruited by Turkey to create a case for the partition of Cyprus.

As a couple of the previous reviewers have noted, this was supposed to be a good short read of the Balkans. Unfortunately, it was dry, dry, dry. The author loves to throw in a lot of ten dollar words in this thesis about the Balkans. One wonders what his ultimate purpose was in writing this book.
I picked up a few themes from his book. One was that Ottomon Empire and the some of the Communist regimes papered over the ethnic differences. At the same time, the ethnic differences were not a big deal for most of the time in the Balkans. Neither were the religious differences, as the population tended to chose what parts of the various practices to follow.
For me, this was not a particularly interesting read. At slighty over a hundred pages, one would assume you could breeze through this book. But the writing and the words used, resulted in me taking six and a half hours to read this book. There are more interesting books out there including Misha Glenny with his The Balkans. I would probably consult that book if I wanted information.

In approximately 185 pages, the author manages to convey and briefly analyze significant historical events in the Balkans in a disciplined scholarly manner. I found the book very engaging and readable. I was amazed at the broad scope of information covered. It was not dull, dry or filled with boring details. He begins to unravel the "mystery" of the Balkans by a description of the land and terrain from which the word "Balkans" originated, few people realize the term was coined only about 200 years ago. For human interest, the author intersperses descriptions from diaries written 150 years ago or so by travelers to the region. We have been led to believe the regional conflicts have been ongoing since the beginning of time .. not so, and the author tells us why! Mark Mazower tells us when the conflicts started and who the major players are. The natural environment, mountains and valleys, created a lifestyle which is mostly agrarian and land-locked. The mountains made the area isolated and almost impenetrable both physically and ideologically to the more "civilized" ideas and industries of the more progressive Westernized European nations. One can understand how the region catapulted into an urbanized industrial complex *only* within the past 200 years. The author clearly writes about the social and political impact of the Ottoman Empire on the Balkans. I was impressed how the author could connect the "peasant values" and lifestyle with the political forces which constantly shaped and redefined the area. The migration of people and their adaptability to the imposed changes due to wars and conflicts is totally amazing. The impact of the decisions of the Great Powers on "nation-building" in the region was explained with erudite precision. The importance of the Greek language in the region due to the past is brought to light. The author's ability to tie ancient history to current events is quite remarkable. This book is highly recommended to anyone who has a desire to learn more about the people and history of the Balkans. It is written by a highly knowledgeable author, former Princeton University professor, who has no personal agenda or ties to the region.
Erika B. (erikab93)

A skillful navigation of the stormy seas of Balkan history. In this brief but significant account, Mazower (Dark Continent, 1998) dispels a number of common misconceptions about one of the most misunderstood regions (and peoples) in the world. He maintains that violence is no more endemic to the Balkans than any other part of Europe, for example, and that for most of its history the area had "no ethnic conflict at all." Of course, this begs the question: Why is it only in the last one or two centuries that the cocktail became politically volatile? The author begins with a discussion of the geography, noting that mountains "have made commerce within the region more expensive and complicated the process of political unification" and showing that even the rivers are not suitable for commerce or communication. He then begins his chronological narrative, arguing that the "basic ethnographic composition" of the Balkans dates to the seventh century a.d. While the major religions-Orthodoxy, Catholicism, and Islam-have always struggled for dominance in the region, they have also (in the remoter provinces, at least) tended to melt into one another, creating a hybrid system "densely populated by invisible spirits, both malicious and benign" (e.g., the vampires of Transylvania). During the 19th century, "nation building" was the prime concern; after WWI, however, regional rivalries were "sharpened and intensified by ideology." Mazower adheres to the conventional belief that federalism "remained the communist strategy for handling [multiple] nationalities," and that Tito's death and the fall of communism caused the system to break down. He also maintains that the development of material prosperity is a prerequisite for the development of strong democratic traditions. A fascinating portrait, and a convincing analysis. (8 maps, chronology)

Dusko Doder and Louise Branson's book covers Milosevic's life and path to power up to Kosovo, when NATO bombardment of Belgrade forced him to back down. The book reveals how Milosevic gave himself a name in 1987, when his boss, Serbian Communist Party leader Ivan Stambolic, sent him to Kosovo to quell down Serbian riots. When confronted by protesters who told them the Kosovo Albanians were beating them, he uttered the phrase, "No one will ever dare beat you again." He became a hero from that day on, a figure to whom the Serbs could rally around.

Milosevic knew that too and betrayed Stambolic, his political mentor, to become president of Serbia. The important things here are the parallels and dissimilarities between Tito and Milosevic. Tito, a communist, wanted a united Yugoslavia, a nation of Slovenes, Croats, Serbs, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Muslims, and Kosovars. Milosevic, a nationalist, wanted a united Serbia, but only for the Serbs. And he wanted to be leader of all Serbs, meaning the Montenegrins, Serbs in Serbia, Bosnian Serbs, and the Krajina Serbs. He even told Milan Panic, Yugoslavia's prime minister, that he was the "Ayatollah Khomeini of Serbia. The Serbs will follow me no matter what."

The trouble with that was, the Serbs in those other areas already had their own leaders, such as Radovan Karadzic, so he had to discredit them or put them down under his thumb, which ultimately didn't work.

Some things that have come to light is the back door deal between Milosevic and then-Croatian president Franjo Tudjman, on dividing Bosnia between them. Milosevic didn't care if he lost the Serb-populated Krajina and Eastern Slavonia, both in Croatia, saying that he would repopulate Kosovo with the Serbs from those regions.

But when the chips fall down, Milosevic used nationalism to get power for himself. The beginning of the end came in the middle of the war in Bosnia, when he was beset by UN sanctions and the Western economic blockade. His own position eroding so he endorsed the Vance-Owen plan to divide Bosnia into ten cantons--3 Serb, 3 Muslim, 2 Croat, 1 (Muslim-Croat), with Sarajevo organized like Washington D.C. Karadzic was vehemently against it and split with Milosevic.

Milosevic was the "man of the hour" at the Dayton talks, in which he agreed to give Sarajevo, the holy grail to Bosnian Serbs, to Muslims, as well as division of Republika Srpska by the Posovina corridor. It was not his to give, but he did it to make himself the good Serb to the West and to cut the Bosnian Serbs down to size. However, this move alienated him from true nationalists such as Karadzic and militia leader Vojislav Sesejl.

Milosevic seems no better than a schoolyard bully. He torments the weak but upon facing someone stronger, backs down, as he did in Kosovo. It took the non-violent student group OTPOR to oust him, but that's another book, which I hope is well-researched and documented like this book.

Some argue that Milosevic is solely responsible for the terrible deeds committed during the civil war in Yugoslavia in the 1990s: without the nationalist indoctrination and provocation undertaken by this tyrant, the war may never have taken place. Others argue that the war was inevitable, and that Milosevic was merely acting out a role that any Serbian leader in those circumstances was destined to play: the real villains here are the people of the former Yugoslavia who bear centuries-old grudges against their neighbours and are willing to obey orders to commit heinous moral crimes.

One would expect a biographer to adopt the former, 'Great Man Theory of History' position, and a historian to adopt the latter position, with its emphasis on longer-term historical processes. The authors strike an appropriate mix between these two explanations. As the title suggests, they pull no punches in depicting Milosevic as the epitome of Machiavellian evil, but they are also sensitive to the details of the social and political environment which allowed him to rise to the top. As such, the book reads less like a biography than an in-depth political history of Yugoslavia between the late-1980s and the present, and is therefore of interest to students of political science.

Milosevic met his future wife Mirjana Markovic at high school in Pozarevac. They also studied together at Belgrade University. Mira studied sociology and was by all accounts an outspoken firebrand; Sloba studied law and was by all accounts a dull spirit and unoriginal thinker - perfect, it would seem, for a career in the Communist Party. Slobodan's political instincts were finely tuned to the times. He knew that to climb up the Communist Party hierarchy, he had to have a mentor. Ivan Stambolic, a friend from Belgrade University, played this role for Milosevic. Articulate and well-connected, he moved up the hierarchy, and by 1975, he was Prime Minister of Serbia. Crucially, he never forgot about Milosevic. Slobodan followed him nearly every step of the way, until the late 1980s, when he started scheming to replace his former friend in the top job.

It was at this point that Milosevic made his infamous conversion from communism to nationalism, with typical Machiavellian poise. In April 1987, Kosovo was about to erupt into civil unrest, with the minority Serb population complaining about their treatment by the majority Albanian population and threatening a mass exodus. Prime Minister Stambolic ordered Milosevic to visit the province in order to calm both sides down. To put it succinctly, he disobeyed orders. Instead of calming them, Milosevic declared to an angry Serbian crowd that "No one will defeat you again". The ecstatic response of the crowd must have seared into Milosevic's mind the importance of the nationalist card. Over the next months and years he assembled a coalition with the aim of protecting Serbian rights from being trampled by her neighbours.

The Serbian nationalist mindset seems to be a curious mixture of glorification of military defeat (the 14th century Battle of Kosovo was an enormous defeat for the Serbs) and a belief that her neighbours are unjustly benefitting from the bravery of the Serbs in defending their freedom. Of course, there is some merit in the idea that the Serbs have received the rough end of the stick for centuries and should not be subjugated simply to preserve some delicate balance of power, as Tito evidently intended. However Serbia, with Milosevic at its helm, was surely the central player in the collapse and civil war that took place in the 1990s. When it was clear that the country was disintegrating, Milosevic made a secret deal with Slovenia, to allow it to secede. After the unilateral secession of Croatia in 1991, Milosevic planned to incorporate large swathes of Croatia in which there were Serb majorities. Infamously, he united with Croatia's Franjo Tudjman to invade Bosnia-Herzegovina and divide the spoils.

Doder and Branson also alert us to the wider international context in which the civil war was played out. The United Nations, and the various peace envoys sent to negotiate truces, assumed that self-determination for the various 'parts' of Yugoslavia was not only the answer, but the right thing to do. In the process, the beliefs of the substantial minority of people who saw themselves as first and foremost 'Yugoslavian' (but were perhaps not as vocal as the extreme nationalists) were disregarded. One is reminded of the current centripetal forces in Indonesia, and whether the United Nations would support its break-up.

The authors also point to the significant support of Milosevic by the United States, perhaps an extension of the tradition in American foreign policy of supporting dictatorships if they bring stability to the region. Milosevic was depicted as a peacemaker at the Dayton Peace Accords - requests to America by the Serbian opposition parties for assistance in deposing him were rebuffed. Four years later, however, following the collapse of the Rambouillet talks over Kosovo, Milosevic was depicted as a warmonger and the full force of NATO was brought against his nation.

Milosevic: Portrait of a Tyrant is valuable book for students interested in Yugoslavia's post-war political history, particularly since the 1980s. Written in 2000, it obviously excludes the war crimes indictment and trial. This process alone will require another Eichmann in Jerusalem, although given his recent performance, the focus ought to be the farce, rather than the banality, of evil.

2001: Slobodan Milosevic appeared in court somber-faced; remaining as defiant and arrogant as ever in response to the charges leveled at him by a presiding judge. It seems like he was brought to justice only by chance; consequently his indictment and later arrest proves that no war criminal can hide forever. His name cropped up repeatedly when war in Kosovo broke out in 1998 and more so when NATO forces intervened and bombed rump Yugoslavia throughout the spring and early summer of 1999. Years before, in Bosnia, he was seen as a problem-solver, appeasing opposing parties and mediators at the Dayton Accords. Three years later, he was seen as the opposite: manipulative, conniving, secretive, deceiving and a perpetrator of gross human rights. The question of his life and background has remained constant, one of speculation and mystery.

Dusko Doder and Louise Branson, therefore, have written the first definitive biography of Slobodan Milosevic. Although their work appeared some time before he was overthrown in October 2000 and later brought to justice in The Hague (obviously the biography is now in need of a little bit of revision in order for it to be up-to-date), it helped to place the Kosovo war into its proper context by focusing on Milosevic, who to all intended purposes, ignited the ethnic question in the Serbian province to his own advantage and did not balk at violating human rights toward transforming Kosovo into a province dominated by Serbs.

His early years, through his birth in Pozarevac, Serbia, on August 22, 1941, to his time at Belgrade University where he became a Communist Party member that played an important role in his development, are detailed in this biography. Emphasis is placed on Milosevic's two-faced diplomacy abroad and at home, where friends one day became enemies to be 'removed,' just like the people under his rule, seen through the wars in (respectively) Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo.

The biography is written and reads like a fast-paced novel, filled with all the almost unreal espionage and seedy characters to be ideally found in fiction. A study of Yugoslavia's demise is incomplete without Doder and Branson's magnificent and revealing biography; to date, there are other works coming out, and surely more will appear, but it remains to be seen if they surpass the current.

Robert Kaplan's "Balkan Ghosts" is a flawed book, but certainly worth reading in order to understand, if nothing else, the prevailing Western attitudes towards the Balkan region of Europe.

The books clear strength lies in the author's lucid, fluid and descriptive writing style - it truly makes the book, from the literary point of view, a joy to read. The reader is given a vivid picture of the Balkan lands Kaplan visits in a sort of 'travelogue from hell' or 'anti-travelogue' regarding places that most readers will not yet have visited. Added to this is a good deal of insight and reportage, interviews with locals, and so forth, that lend the book much readability and depth.

Unfortunately, however, the book is marred by the author's own Western prejudices and biases. What we have here is a critique, in many ways, of the 'backwards East' and a not-so-subtle head-shaking that the region is not more 'Western' in outlook.

The problems surface on two levels: First, Kaplan's descriptions of the local cultural life are off the mark, due in many cases to his lack of understanding of Orthodox Christianity. Many ignorant comments are notable regarding Orthodox religious art, piety, liturgical life, church organization, etc. Kaplan is right that the Orthodox tradition has had a profound influence on the region, but his conclusions as to the nature of this impact are nothing more than a perpetuation of the common and long-held Western stereotypes about the Eastern Orthodox part of Europe - in particular, the myth that Eastern Orthodox Christianity is a dangerous brew of mysticism, austerity and nationalism. Not only is this an incorrect summary, but the impressionistic conclusion is false -- the reality of the impact of the Orthodox Church on these countries in the twentieth century is much more complex and nuanced than Mr. Kaplan leads the reader to believe. Kaplan would have been better served to study more about Orthodox Christianity before repeating so many tired stereotypes about it in this book. But, alas, many Western readers are not in a position to correct Mr. Kaplan, and will accept what he writes as true, thereby experiencing a convenient confirmation of their existing stereotypes.

Second, Kaplan's 'program' for the region is unabashedly biased towards the 'enlightened' Western approach. According to Kaplan, the post-Enlightenment West is the paradigm that the world (or at least this part of it) must follow, and he accords much of the problems of these countries to their non-Western, Byzantine, Slavic, Eastern Orthodox Christian background - in a vast, vast overstatement and oversimplification of the real situation in the Balkans and in Europe in general. The fact that the Enlightenment itself led to the drastic decline of ethical life in the 'West', and the development of the political ideologies that are the real cause of the tragedies of the Twentieth Century seems lost on Kaplan, who would solve the problems of the Balkan region by imposing the full-blown developments of Western Enlightenment ideology on these Southeastern Europeans.

The story of the Balkans is simple enough - it is a region that has been 'put upon' by outsiders for centuries, each with their own designs for the region - the Venetians, the Byzantines, the Ottomans, the Austrians, the Nazis, etc. In the act of being downtrodden, rivalries developed and these have in some cases developed into ethnic hatreds. These hatreds are easily manipulable by local political powers to engage the population in one or another act of internal or external agression (read: scapegoating). The influence of outsiders on the region has been profoundly negative historically, and in my opinion, Kaplan is mistaken to assume that yet another 'design' for the region would meet with any greater success than the previous ones have.

Read 'Balkan Ghosts' for a great travelogue and an excellent portrayal of the present Western stereotypical view of the Balkans. But don't take his strereotypes to heart - the truth is much more complex and nuanced, and the region needs to be understood from the 'inside out' rather than the view from the 'outside in' that Kaplan presents here.

In this book Robert Kaplan describes his travels in the 1980s and early 90s throughout the Balkan region, and with his insights into the area's politics and ethnic struggles, he correctly predicted the coming catastrophe that would engulf the area. Kaplan was one of the few western journalists who knew anything about the Balkans at the time, and nobody seemed to be very interested in this European backwater. Thus, the world was surprised by the orgy of war crimes and ethnic cleansing that erupted here in the 90s, but Kaplan wasn't. In the more recent introduction to the current edition, Kaplan gets rather big-headed talking about how his timely predictions came true, but not without justification, as his gifts for insight and observation gave him the prescience that nobody else had or wanted about this region.

While most travel writers stick to colorful (and western-oriented) descriptions of people and places, Kaplan instead focuses on history and politics, and their deep influences on the dynamics of the regions he visits. While traveling through Yugoslavia, Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece, he describes the deep historical and ethnic roots of these closely related countries. Here, events of 600 years ago still cause deep resentment. A history of small ethnic groups repeatedly conquering each other through the centuries, then being destroyed by outside invaders, has led to severe racial hatred and periodic outbursts of incredible violence. Kaplan provides great insight into the perpetual desire of these peoples to return to their periods of greatest historical strength and largest territories. A disturbing example of this is Macedonia, which both Greece and Serbia would like to annex because it contains populations of their kinsmen. Meanwhile the ethnic Macedonians think they are entitled to all the lands and peoples conquered by their native son Alexander the Great back in ancient times. There is a similar problem in Kosovo, coveted by Serbia and Albania for the same reasons. Also of note is Kaplan's section on Greece, which proves without a doubt that this nation is not the classical stereotype that the West thinks it is. Greece is far more similar to Turkey and the Middle East than to the mythical realm of Socrates and Aristotle. And they have the same insane and hateful politics and ethnic resentment as their neighbors Bulgaria and the former Yugoslavia.

The main problem throughout the region is that all these peoples live interspersed among each other, and would just love to force everyone else out and build their own pure kingdoms. The logistical impossibilities of this never stopped anyone though, resulting in many occurrences of mass genocide, which most of the ethnic groups in the region have both committed and suffered from at various points in history. For many miserable decades, the Ottoman and Soviet empires forced everybody in the region to shut up, which merely redirected the people's resentment toward these outside rulers. Nobody in the West should have been surprised when the people turned back to destroying each other when these empires collapsed. The most disturbing realization in this book is that (except for the Turks) these small, self-destructive, and murderous ethnic groups are not that different from each other, but that has not stopped them from a thousand years of back-and-forth enslavement and genocide. For those who think the world is destined to become a happy melting pot in which everyone drops their differences and lives in harmony - we could learn a lot from this region.

This was a fantastic book, a wonderful blend of history and travel writing. Reading it I learned a great deal about the Balkans, particularly the lands of the former Yugoslavia as well as Romania, Bulgaria, and Greece.

One of the best aspects of the book was how Robert D. Kaplan tied together some unifying characteristics of the Balkan states, bringing some order, at least conceptually, to a rather chaotic region. I loved how he wrote that whatever has happened in any trouble spot in the Middle East happened in the Balkans first; for instance they produced the first terrorists of the 20th century (the IMRO or Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization). Before there were radical Muslim clerics in the headlines there were radical Orthodox clergy in the Balkans. The dispossessed Palestinians throughout the Middle East were preceded in the early decades of the 20th century by the huge number of Macedonian refugees in Sofia, Bulgaria, the result of the Second Balkan War in 1913. Even the Palestinian Intifada had its predecessor in the Albanian intifada in Serbia beginning in the early 1980s.

One defining aspect of the various Balkan nations that Kaplan noted was that each one desires that its borders revert to where they were at the exact time of its zenith. This was especially clear in the case of Macedonia; many Greeks believe it is theirs since that was where Alexander the Great hailed from; the Bulgarians had it in the 10th and 13th centuries; it was part of the Serbian empire in the 14th century. As he puts it, the principal sickness of the Balkans is "conflicting dreams of lost imperial glory."

This book has often been cited for its excellent coverage of the former Yugoslavia, and rightly so, showing a very diverse land, states so diverse today it is hard to believe they were ever united, countries at times mired in past glories and horrors. In Croatia the debate over the World War II legacy of Cardinal Aloysisu Stepinac serves as the primary symbol of the Serb-Croat conflict. Kaplan vividly contrasts Croatia, which is a fairly western, urbane, and ethnically uniform nation, with Bosnia, a "morass" of ethnically mixed mountain villages, "rural, isolated, and full of suspicions and hatreds." He writes that Serbia, almost from its inception in the 12th century, was among the most civilized states in Europe at the time; in the 14th century an empire so powerful that it challenged the Byzantine Empire itself. Indeed Constantinople was so desperate to fight off the advances of King Stefan Dushan that they invited Turkish armies into Europe, which eventually defeated the Serbians at arguably the defining battle of Balkan history, at Kosovo Polje, the Field of Black Birds, in 1389, destroying the Serbian kingdom and creating a legacy of hatred and revenge from that battle that would continue till today.

I thought his chapters on Romania even better, a nation through which he traveled extensively. He vividly showed that Romania in the past and to a large degree today is a land where one's survival was paramount - understandable in a nation invaded and ruled by so many - where prostitution, informing on others, and black marketeering were commonplace, so much so that Tsar Nicholas II sneered that being Romanian was not a nationality but a profession. This has been true both on an individual level and on a national level, as Romanian history has been one desperate deal after another to stave off doom. Romania he writes in some ways is an odd land, one caught between East and West; seemingly Slavic, its language Latinate, perhaps more similar to ancient Latin than modern Italian or Spanish, its culture a mixture of the Latin bent for melodrama and the Byzantine and Orthodox legacy of intrigue and mysticism.

His portrait of Bulgaria was also quite interesting, a country in the Cold War seemingly squarely under the thumb of Moscow but perhaps more independent than most satellite nations, careful to exercise its policies under the table and covertly, often at the expense of hated Turkey, even involving truly Byzantine plots such as the plan to assassinate the Pope. Kaplan writes that some of its people represent it being dismissed as a mere Communist backwater, as it was once a powerful empire in the 9th and 10th centuries, the first of all Slav peoples to embrace Orthodox Christianity, and it was from Bulgaria that the monks Cyril and Methodius spread the Cyrillic alphabet to Russia and elsewhere, making it the birthplace of Slavonic languages and culture.

Kaplan includes Greece as part of the Balkans, even though many he writes do not regard it as such. Having lived at the time of the writing seven years in Greece, he saw first hand that Greece at times was only superficially a Mediterranean and Western country. Just as in other Balkan countries, there are those in Greece who rage about the fate of lands that were once theirs and of Greek minorities abroad. Though Greece produced the first humanistic culture and art, one that glorified the individual rather than the ruler, Westerners often mistakenly believe that this is the defining characteristic of Greece, rather than seeing it as a battleground between East and West on the very fringes of Europe, and fail to take into account later Greek history as much modern Greek thought owes more to Byzantine and Ottoman legacies rather than to Classical times. Much of Greek history and culture is symbolized by the divide between the Hellene, what the ancient Greeks called themselves, their roots in the West, relying on principle and logic, and the Romios, the Greeks of the Eastern Roman and later Byzantine Empires, relying on instinct, on the miracle working powers of icons, seeing Greece as outside Europe.

I have only scratched the surface of this riveting book here. I highly recommend it, one that really helped me see common threads both with modern events and the past and among the various Balkan countries.

Glenny's The Balkans is easily the best work on the subject in print to date. While managing to stay above the fray of inter-ethnic rivalries, Glenny provides a clear picture of modern Balkan history, arguing that the troubles the region suffers from is not the result of years of mutual ethnic hatereds, but rather the result of constant interference by the Great Powers (whomever that may be at the time.) The book is just short of encyclopedic - its depth and scope can be overwhelming at times. Nonetheless, I found it a fascinating read. Glenny looks beyond "Yugoslavia" in his study of the Balkans, giving attention to Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania as players (and victims) in the "Eastern Quesiton." This is as it should be. His argument about "outside forces" interfereing with the nationalistic development of the Balkan peoples is convinving. Yet there are flaws. The Slovenes are hardly addressed at all; one would think they warrant at least some consideration in any discussion of the area. Comparitively little time is spent on Romania and Bulgaria after the Second World War, and even less is devoted to the sticky issues of the Vojvodina, Banat and Backa - all of which face similar issues with Serbia as Kossovo does. My final criticism is his all too brief treatment and hasty analysis of the "disintegration" of Yugoslavia in the early 90's. With that said, I recommend this book to the serious reader or student of the region only. The information is dense, the history is complicated, and the major players (within and without the Balkans) can confuse the uninitiated. I am confident you will enjoy The Balkans as much as I did.

Misha Glenny's The Balkans is an outstanding effort to make sense of the current imbroglio by placing it into historical context. Too many people have no understanding of the region's past, so the temptation to conclude that "those people have hated one another for a thousand years" legitimizes sensationalized media reports. Glenny's intent to prove otherwise resulted in this provocative and engrossing account.

Glenny argues there is no historical basis for national hatreds visible today. During the Ottoman period Serb and Croat, Muslim and Christian lived side by side with little hostile interaction. Religion and culture superseded political identities in defining Balkan society. Glenny does not dispute the theory that the Ottoman Empire was the "sick man of Europe" but the Ottomans did provide a stabilizing presence in the area, even after the Serb rebellion of 1804.

However, Balkan history is far from benign. War has always been a determinant in the political landscape. Unfortunately, brutal murder, rape, and carnage were characteristics that survived modernizing efforts. Throughout the 19th century, individual Balkan groups took on the Ottomans (Serbia in 1804, Greece from 1821-30, Croatia in 1848) with varying outcomes, but it was not until 1885 that two Balkan nations first fought one another. Beginning in 1878, but particularly after 1885, the storm that eventually became World War One began to take shape. Soon the whole world was impacted by Balkan history. But the Balkans were not solely responsible for any of the world's conflicts, and they certainly do not have a monopoly on war-related atrocities.

Yet this does not mean present Serb-Croat and/or Bosnian tensions were inevitable. In fact, Glenny writes of specific dates when Serbs and Croats came to blows (as in World War Two, 1967, or after 1991) but implies the interim there was relatively calm. Bosnia is specifically discussed at certain points (1908, 1914, 1992) but it is not a scene of nonstop bloodletting.

Glenny's work reflects a masterful understanding of his subject. Many readers may learn of events for the first time. The Greek-Turkish War of 1921-3, or the several pre1999 incidents of conflicts over Kosovo are examples. A Serb bias is noticeable, and his portrayal of Stalin as cooperative with the West detracts somewhat from the book, but the overall effort is excellent. The Balkans should be considered by anyone interested in southeast Europe.

Glenny presents a very refreshing, well-planned, and very readable general survery of modern Balkan history. Starting out with a discussion of the "West's" Orientalist outlook on the Balkans, Glenny sets out to discuss the region's history with a view to correct many of the misconceptions developed in the popular foreign discourse on the region.

Glenny's extensive discussion of the history of the non-Yugoslav nations is also appreciated, as the history of these nations has often been forgotten, despite their historical involvement with the Yugoslav state.

Having lived and travelled in the Balkans, I can say from personal experiences and encounters that Glenny conveys an accurate, and relatively unbiased account of the region's rich history. This book is a MUST for anyone interested in understanding the past, present, and future of this most interesting region. It is a shame that most of the policy makers, and journalists involved with the region have not read this book -- a fact made plain by their often skewed coverage.